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Abstract
In many cases it was China’s longstanding solidarity with several liberation movements in Africa 
in the colonial period which was later upgraded to bilateral and state-level diplomatic relations in 
the postcolonial era. However, the twenty-ﬁrst century has also brought about quantitative and 
potentially qualitative changes in Sino-African relations which are more complex than what the 
advocates of stronger Sino-African relations (Sino-optimists) and proponents of disengagement 
(Sino-pessimists) seem to suggest. The deﬁning patterns of China’s inﬂuence in Africa are either 
not yet fully crystallized or they come in paradoxical pairs. The essay spells out the manifestations 
of these paradoxes and what can be done under the circumstances to improve the African condi-
tion. The divergent schools of thought about the possible impacts of China’s increased activities in 
Africa seem not to be totally unrelated to their underlying assumptions about the causes of Africa’s 
unsuccessful modernization. The essay also explores these intellectual issues by focusing on the 
contradictory dimensions of Afro-Chinese relations.
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Introduction
Chinese intermittent contacts with Africans go back to earlier centuries, but 
large-scale encounters between the two peoples took place only after the advent 
of the colonial era, with Chinese labor used extensively by the British, the 
French, and even the Germans in places ranging from Mauritius and Tang-
anyika to Madagascar and Reunion. Chinese laborers were also brought to 
South Africa early in the 20th century to work for Europeans in the mines. 
During the struggle for independence in much of Africa, it can be also recalled 
that China stood ﬁrmly with several African liberation movements. It was 
against such a backdrop that China arrived in Africa in the opening years of the 
twenty-ﬁrst century as a would-be major power in the international scene.
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Three strands of thought dominate the contemporary discourse about the 
long-term impacts of China’s increased involvement in Africa: Sino-opti-
mism, Sino-skepticism, and Sino-pessimism. The optimistic school maintains 
that China’s emphatic re-entry into Africa is to be celebrated. Africa stands to 
gain much from a closer partnership with the new China. Sino-skeptics are 
less sanguine and view China’s renewed interest and greater involvement in 
Africa as neo-colonial both in intent and consequence. They maintain that 
China is another neo-colonial power in the making because the logic of capi-
tal is the same whether those in the driving seat are the Europeans, the Amer-
icans or the Chinese. Sino-pessimists go further and claim that Africa’s 
engagement with China would not only perpetuate the structure of depen-
dency and underdevelopment which is already in place, but it would also 
inhibit or block Africa’s eﬀorts to overcome them. It should be also noted 
from the outset that a degree of correspondence seems also to exist between 
an analysts’ perception of the cause of Africa’s underdevelopment and the 
presumed consequences arising from Chinese massive penetration of the con-
tinent, with those linking Africa’s underdevelopment to external factors view-
ing the consequences of China’s arrival more favorably. Middle-of-the-road 
theories are also reﬂected in the ongoing debate, but this essay would concern 
itself primarily with the above “ideal” types.
In terms of the long-standing theoretical traditions, the above schools of 
thought roughly correspond to variants of the three “ideologies” of international 
political economy; namely – realism, liberalism and Marxism. For Sino-opti-
mists liberalism provides the theoretical justiﬁcation for a deeper engagement 
between Africa and China. Liberals assume that both China and Africa would 
be better oﬀ from a greater Chinese involvement in Africa even though China, 
as the stronger party in the partnership, would gain more. But if the “right” pol-
icies are adopted by African states, Africa would beneﬁt from such international 
exchange, with trade serving as the “engine of economic growth.”
Marxists, like Sino-skeptics, do not completely dismiss the beneﬁts Africa 
could gain from sustained investment and international trade. However, they 
maintain that Afro-Chinese economic interaction is not vastly diﬀerent from 
the one in which Africa is already engaged with North America and Europe. 
They are all economic exchanges between unequal partners which perpetuate 
existing international division of labor that is detrimental to the economic 
development of Africa. Believing that whatever beneﬁt is gained from such 
exchanges goes primarily to the ruling groups, Marxists and neo-Marxists 
question the view that sustained Sino-African relations would meaningfully 
contribute to socio-economic transformation of African societies and regard 
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disengagement rather than engagement as the ultimate panacea for Africa’s 
developmental problems. The existing system simply cannot be reformed.
Sino-pessimists seem to accept the basic premise of political realism about 
international relations and international political economy that the interac-
tion between China and African states is a zero-sum game in which the stron-
ger party gains at the expense of the weaker. But, they also concede, this is a 
fact of international life and should be accepted as such. Neither reform nor 
revolution could change this structure.
The underlying premise of the generalizations which have been formulated 
by Sino-optimists, Sino-skeptics and Sino-pessimists about the impacts China 
is having or would have in Africa is that there is already a discernible pattern 
in China’s policy toward Africa. This essay argues that if there is a pattern in 
China’s policy in Africa, it can only be expressed in terms of sets of paradoxes. 
The reality on the ground is as much a conﬁrmation of the above divergent 
theses as it is their disconﬁrmation. As Chris Alden et al. (2008, 14) remind 
us, the ﬂuctuations in Afro-Chinese relations [and their outcomes] in recent 
years alone have been profound.
This means that the shape Sino-African relations would ultimately take is 
unknown for now and that, therefore, the situation poses a great challenge 
for Africa, even as it also opens up a new window of opportunity for chan-
neling the relationship in a desirable direction. I will review below the major 
assumptions about China in Africa in order to demonstrate how China’s 
behavior sometimes deﬁes these assumptions, driving home the point that 
simple generalizations about the nature and consequences of Chinese behav-
ior in Africa may be premature.
Economic Foundations of Afro-Chinese Relations
Although China’s capital and investment follows Africa’s natural resources, 
they do not ﬁt into a predictable pattern. China’s re-entry into Africa in the 
last decade and a half was driven by the country’s growing demand for Afri-
ca’s natural resources, so goes the master-narrative, a narrative which is also 
supported both by oﬃcial rhetoric on both sides. The value of Africa’s export 
of its natural resources to China has grown substantially in recent years with 
cobalt, chromium, manganese and timber constituting major non-oil items.
Another critical resource for which China signiﬁcantly relies on Africa is 
oil. China’s oil imports from world regions in 2001-2006 in percentage was 
as follows: from Middle East & North Africa 46; from Sub-Saharan Africa 
27; from Europe & Central Asia 10; from East Asia & the Paciﬁc 8; and 
from Latin America & the Caribbean 3. And here are China’s oil imports for 
the same period in percentage by African country: from Angola 51; from 
 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 337
Sudan 18; from Congo Republic 13; from Equatorial Guinea 11, from Nige-
ria 3; from Chad 1; and from Gabon 1(see Foster et al. 2008, 32; for data in 
earlier period see Broadman 2007, 82-83).
If it is a common postulate that Chinese increased activities in Africa were 
linked to China’s growing demand for Africa’s natural resources, empirical 
data also lends support to this claim (Maswana 2009, 91-105). But, even in 
this regard, China’s behaviors are not without some curious contradictions. 
Why, for instance, is China investing relatively heavily in some African coun-
tries with little or no proven natural resources critical for China? Why is 
China investing fairly heavily in sectors which have no direct relevance for 
China’s economic needs? Ethiopia, for instance, exports neither oil nor other 
minerals critical for China and is not also a major exporter of timber – 
another important commodity China imports from Africa. And yet, Ethiopia 
has become one of the top four countries in which China has committed 
large-scale infrastructure projects in recent years (Foster et al. 2008, 21).
But Ethiopia is not the only country in this regard. A broadly similar 
“anomaly” can be seen in China’s interest in Central African Republic, Libe-
ria, Madagascar and Somalia. In short, the interest of China in Africa is not 
limited to resource-rich countries. China has intensiﬁed its activities in 
resource-poor countries, too. But it would be missing the point to suggest, as 
Sino-optimists do, that China’s Africa policy is therefore driven purely by 
China’s desire to help Africa.
China’s trade with Africa has grown exponentially over the past several years. 
The Chinese two-way trade with Africa was about US$10.5 billion in 2000, and 
this ﬁgure changed in the ensuing years as follows: US$29.5 billion in 2004; 
US$40 billion in 2005; US$55.5 billion in 2006; US$73 billion in 2007; pro-
jected US$117 billion in 2008 (Alden et al. 2008, 6). But, again, China’s trade 
with Africa is still relatively small compared to other regions. The table below 
shows the breakdown of China’s trade by world regions for selected years.
Table 1
China’s trade with selected partners (in percentage)
 Year EU US Japan Africa
 1990 11.1      8.5 14.7 2.0
 2000 16.5 20.9 16.7 2.7
 2006 19.6 21.0   9.5 2.7
Source: UNCTAD (2008, 54).
More than the comparative value of international trade, what carries more signif-
icant implication for Africa’s future is the general structure of economic  relations. 
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The bulk of Chinese exports to Africa has been processed products, but more 
than a quarter of Africa’s imports from China in 2005 were composed of tele-
communications equipment, transportation vehicles, electrical appliances and 
industrial equipment (Atlas, 2006). In 2005-2006, 11.97 percent of electrical 
machinery, approximately 29 percent of computer equipments and 18.85 per-
cent of telecommunications equipment sold around the world were made in 
China (UNCTAD 2008, 159). As shown below, China’s trade structure is 
acquiring more and more features of the industrialized  powers of the past.
Table 2
China’s trade structure by product group (value of exports in percentage)
 food items fuels machinery & transport equipment
1995  8.3 3.6 21.1
2000  5.4 3.2 33.1
2006 2.9 1.8 47.1
Source: UNCTAD (2008, 123).
On the other hand, the exports of African countries have remained primary 
commodities. In 2005-06, for instance, Ethiopia’s exports constituted coﬀee 
and coﬀee substitutes (38.7 percent), oil seeds (17.4 percent) crude vegetable 
materials 11.9 percent (UNCTAD 2008, 159). Similarly, if we look respec-
tively at Angola and the Sudan in the same period, crude petroleum & bitu-
minous oil constituted 95.2 percent and 85.4 percent of the values of their 
exports (UNCTAD 2008, 156 & 170).
Table 3
Africa’s level of reliance on the export of mono-commodities
Share of non-oil commodities in total exports of select African countries 
2003-2005
          Country Share % Important Focus Commodity
Burundi 93.76 coﬀee
Mali 89.32 cotton
Tanzania 85.18 gold, cotton, coﬀee, tobacco
Malawi 85.00 tobacco
Burkina Faso 84.24 cotton
Ghana 83.22 gold, cocoa
Rwanda 82.01 coﬀee
Benin 81.40 cotton
Source: Spero and Hart (2010, 269).
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Africa’s share of world exports and the terms of trade for primary commodi-
ties have been steadily declining over the past ﬁfty years. And the arrival of 
China seems so far to have had no major eﬀect on the overall trend.
The new Sino-African relations have in any case ushered in an entirely new 
concept in the political economy of South-South relations: the formula of 
“resources for infrastructure” or the so-called the Angola mode. To be sure, 
the idea itself is not new, but the concept is. The “Angola mode” facilitates 
the exploitation of natural resources, which Africa has in abundance. The for-
mula also allows Africa to import needed resources from China, which it 
could not have done so if ﬁnancial repayment should be required. More sig-
niﬁcantly, the “Angola mode” ties the exploitation of natural resources or 
infrastructure development to Chinese imports of Africa’s resources. In addi-
tion to Angola, this formula is being heavily relied upon in Sudan, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Zimbabwe, Gabon and Botswana.
China’s focus on infrastructure development in Africa in recent years has 
drawn special attention. This is not surprising because the level of Chinese 
investment in this sector is not only high but is increasing rapidly. Chinese 
investment in Africa jumped from US$500 million in early 2000s to US$7 
billion in 2006 (Foster et al. 2008, 13). Partly it was this “ﬂood” of Chinese 
investment which has led Sino-optimists to view China’s intentions in Africa 
as profoundly diﬀerent from those of the major Western powers. Olopade 
Dayo (2008) recent remark reﬂects such a sentiment. Dayo writes: “China is 
the only global power laying the tracks for an Africa-wide economic renais-
sance.” Sino-optimists indicate that the size and quality of China’s investment 
in Africa could propel Africa towards a self-sustaining economic development 
(B. Sautman and Y. Hairong 2008, 87-133; Broadman 2007, 97).
However, the empirical data again paints a mixed picture. Although Chi-
na’s investment in the continent is substantial and growing, it is still modest 
compared to China’s investment elsewhere. From China’s total overseas FDI 
in 2006, for instance, the share of Africa was relatively small, 4%, compared 
to Latin America’s 26 % and Asia’s 64% (Alden et al. 2008, 4; also see Guer-
rero and Manji 2008, 1-2). Even though China has paid considerable atten-
tion to the African oil sector in recent years, its investment even in this sector 
also pales in comparison to what other international oil companies have 
already invested in the continent. And much of Africa’s oil exports have, in 
any case, continued to go to OECD countries. In 2006, 40 percent of Africa’s 
oil production was exported to the United States while 15 percent went to 
China (Foster et al. 2008, ix).
China’s investment in Africa is also far less outstanding in comparison to 
the “infrastructure deﬁcit” in the continent, which is estimated to require 
340 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355
about US $ 22 billion annually (Foster et al. 2008, 23). Indeed, it may be 
because of this huge deﬁcit that China’s relatively modest infrastructural 
investment seems to be leaving larger footprint in the continent, thereby 
making it recently the focus of much attention.
Between Selective Multilateralism and Bilateralism
In the context of Afro-Chinese relations, a distinction can be made between 
two forms of diplomatic multilateralism. One form of multilateralism repre-
sents, for instance, a relationship between China on the one hand and the 
African Union (AU) or other regional organizations within Africa on the 
other. Multilateralism could also take a form in which China joins ranks with 
other “development partners,” or donor countries and multilateral institu-
tions in the North such as the World Bank and the IMF. This form of multi-
lateralism is at work when China cooperates with OECD countries. In this 
vein, China signed the 2004 Paris Declaration on Aid Eﬀectiveness, and it 
ratiﬁed the UN convention against corruption.
The China-Africa Forum, inaugurated in 2000, can be viewed also as a 
form of multilateralism. Chinese interest in some form of multilateral frame-
work in its dealings with Africa is therefore clear. But it is a gross exaggera-
tion to assert: “unlike Western countries, China prefers to act with Africa as a 
whole” (Baregu 2008, 163). This may, in fact, be Sino-optimism at its 
extreme.
China can be multilateralist about one aspect of an issue and bilateralist 
about another. A good example of this formulation was evident when China 
supported the international eﬀort on Darfur without relinquishing its bilat-
eralist approach in relations with the Sudan (Srinivasan 2008, 76). Recently, 
China pursued a broadly similar policy with respect to the conﬂict in the 
Congo (Curtis 2008, 94-95).
China has thus not completely shunned multilateralism, but it clearly prefers 
bilateralism in its relations with African countries. China’s conducts relations 
with individual African countries on a one-on-one basis and its emphasis on 
“non-intervention” in the internal aﬀairs of these countries underscore the value 
it attaches to bilateralism in its foreign policy toward Africa. Theoretically, 
China has also rejected the view that the institution of state has weakened as 
the result of the forces of globalization (Keith 2004, 507).
It must be noted that bilateral relationship is more beneﬁcial for China 
than for Africa simply because African countries could win more favorable 
concessions from China collectively than they could do so individually. This 
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was, in fact, what China has learned from its interactions with South East 
Asian countries (Acharya 2008, 324). For instance, China’s exclusively relies 
upon Africa for such strategic raw materials as cobalt (Foster et al. 2008, 31). 
Among the major industrial uses of cobalt are the preparation of high-speed 
cutting tools and the high-energy radiation – both of which are very critical 
in modern industry. It is not hard therefore to imagine what a collective bar-
gaining approach by Africa could do in this instance. For one thing, it could 
forestall the competition between South Africa, DRC and Republic of Congo 
for markets for selling their cobalt to China. But an eﬀective multilateralist 
approach for Africa eschews what Broadman (2007, 18) called ‘the spaghetti 
bowl of Africa regional trade agreements.’ Broadman was referring to the 
more than fourteen overlapping regional economic groupings on the African 
continent.
A multilateral engagement between Africa and China is also bound to con-
tribute to the eﬀort toward some sort of integration of the continent. There 
is thus a school of thought in Africa, the Sino-pessimist school, which con-
ceives the long-term consequences of China’s Africa policy that is primarily 
centered on bilateralism as undesirable since it would deepen Africa’s under-
development by producing uneven eﬀects in diﬀerent economic sectors and 
in diﬀerent countries, ultimately impeding economic and political integra-
tion of the continent.
The Myth of Non-Intervention
In a tone typical to Sino-optimism, Le Pere (2008, 32) has observed: “China 
supports principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal aﬀairs 
of African countries in contrast to what it sees as the ‘hegemonism’ of the 
West.” A World Bank publication also declares how China “eschews any 
interference in domestic aﬀairs” (Foster et al. 2008, vii; also see Zafar 2007, 
126). It is safe to say that a general consensus has now emerged that China 
loathes interference in the internal aﬀairs of African countries.
But it is all too easy to overstate China’s “non-interference” in the internal 
aﬀairs of African states. Part of the problem is that analysts sometimes lose 
sight of the diﬀerent levels of interference. Although China has continually 
espoused the principle of non-interference, it has never remained a passive 
on-looker when its interests were at stake. With regard to Darfur, for instance, 
President Hu indicated in 2007 in Khartoum that China’s policy would con-
tinue to be guided by the principle of non-interference, but it also recognizes 
“the imperative to improve the situation in Darfur and living conditions of 
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local people” (Quoted in Srinivasan 2008, 78). The issue thus becomes not 
whether China interferes in the domestic aﬀairs of African states or not, but 
when it does, what forms interference takes and with what consequences.
Interference can be direct or indirect. Ideologically and militarily, China 
has historically aligned itself with Africa’s liberation movements during the 
struggle for decolonization in the continent. Since the 1960s, the Chinese 
have supported one or another group of African liberation ﬁghters in one 
way or another in, among other countries, Algeria, Niger, Portuguese Guinea, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cameron, Zaire, Congo, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. China itself does not deny that 
these were interventions – but only that they were generally good interven-
tions so long as the goal was to end colonialism. This is from Africa’s vantage 
point the least controversial form of China’s intervention in contemporary 
Africa – notwithstanding the fact that China sometimes sided with the wrong 
“nationalist movement,” as was the case in Angola when it supported the a 
movement that was also allied with the West.
Perhaps the most direct Chinese interference in the domestic aﬀairs of an 
African country in recent years took place in Zambia in the context of the 
2006 national Presidential election. Here is how Muna Ndulo (2008, 146) 
related the issue:
One opposition leader, Michael Sata, of the Patriotic Front Party, campaigned on 
anti-China platform and promised to expel the Chinese if elected to oﬃce and to 
break diplomatic relations with China and instead establish relations with Taiwan…
During the general election, China, ill advisedly, reacted to Sata’s public attacks on 
Chinese investors and threatened to halt all investments if Sata was elected president.
It may be important to note, however, that Chinese diplomats in Zambia 
sought to put a spin on the incident by presenting it as a case of conﬁrmation 
of China’s principle of non-interference in the internal aﬀairs of another 
country rather than its repudiation. Because the Zambian opposition leader, 
Mr. Sata, had threatened to recognize Taiwan, the Chinese diplomats in 
Zambia said that that was tantamount to his interference in the internal 
aﬀairs of China (Alden et al. 2008, 5). It was perhaps an observation such as 
this which led Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2007, 15) to warn that: “Chi-
na’s involvement in the local/domestic politics in terms of supporting some 
political groups or parties in order to have access to the market, cheap labor 
and raw materials can undermine its commitment to social progress 
 programs.”
A distinction should also be made between the notion of peaceful co- 
existence and the principle of non-intervention. China has never claimed that 
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it was the messenger of peace in Africa. It has also never been such. China 
has supplied arms to conﬂicting parties in Africa. China’s record in the conti-
nent when it comes to peace and stability is problematic, on balance, if we 
discount for the moment the case of China’s military assistance to various lib-
eration struggles in Africa. China’s arms have contributed to the perpetuation 
of violent conﬂicts in places ranging from the Congo to the Sudan and the 
Horn of Africa (Srinivasan 2008, 60, Le Pere 2008, 29, Curtis 2008, 94). “In 
1995”, writes Chung-lian Jiang (2008) “when Nigeria was isolated and sanc-
tioned by the international community for the execution of nine Ogni politi-
cal dissidents, Peking continued to supply it with weapons, in spite of strong 
Western pressure”. China has been involved in supplying military equipment 
to the Sudan and Zimbabwe, too, among others.
There are, of course, cases where it is hard to determine the extent of Chi-
nese involvement in African conﬂicts even if the arms used were made in 
China.
Indirect interference occurs when China extends military assistance on the 
basis of the principle that the enemy of my friend is my enemy. This was 
the scenario which unfolded when Robert Mugabe militarily intervened in 
the Congo, using Chinese-supplied arms, in support of Laurent Kabila 
 (Curtis 2008, 94). Again, it is true that an arms supplier could not always 
have the ultimate say on how the arms are used.
When China’s activities in one area or at one time produce domestic polit-
ical consequences in another area or at another time, whether desirable/fore-
seeable or not, these consequences are from the vantage point of China and/
or the host government, the interference also becomes indirect. One example 
of such indirect interference, the consequence of which would perhaps take 
time to fathom, relates to China’s pattern of investment in Africa in recent 
years. Admittedly, the economic sector is where China’s principle of “non-in-
tervention” is most easy to identify and enforce since China does not gener-
ally attach speciﬁc policy conditions in its lending and investment practices 
in Africa.
China has also invested signiﬁcantly in some African countries in the non-
extractive sectors. Angola is one example where China investment in the tele-
communications sector is heavy (Corkin 2008, 115). Another example is 
Ethiopia. The share of telecommunications infrastructure in China’s invest-
ment in Ethiopia in 2006 was US $1.5 billion, and this is the largest ICT 
project in Africa. When the project is completed, it is expected that it would: 
“double the country’s optical ﬁber deployment, more than triple mobile net-
work expansion capacity, double rural telecom coverage, and quadruple the 
length of the ﬁxed telephone network” (Foster et al. 2008, 18). According to 
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the same authors (2008, viii), “[i]n total in 2001-07, Chinese telecom ﬁrms 
supplied almost US $3 billion worth of ICT equipment, mainly in Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Ghana.” Such a heavy Chinese investment in this sector in Ethio-
pia, potentially enhancing more interactivity and interconnectivity among 
the populace and with the outside world, could not be thought of as having 
no long-term domestic political implications to the civil society and the 
future of the authoritarian rule in the country. In the long run, in other 
words, China’s investment may pose greater danger to the authoritarian 
regime in Ethiopia than any direct Chinese interference in the domestic 
aﬀairs of the country. The potent power of ICT has proven to be profound in 
countries ranging from the Philippines to Thailand, and most recently Iran, 
in stimulating and enabling mass political actions. It is true that China pro-
vides African governments not only with the technology for mass dissemina-
tion of information but also with the tools for suppressing them if necessary 
(in the form, for instance, of electronic jamming equipments). This was pre-
cisely what China has done in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye 2008, 134). But 
enhancing the government’s power to suppress information is an interference 
as well.
As a rising power actively involved in Africa, China could hardly practice 
the principle of non-intervention even if it wishes to do so. No interference, 
no inﬂuence. Both the power and the desire of a major actor to interfere, in 
fact, increase proportionally to its aspirations and its status in the interna-
tional system.
But intervention is not always externally-induced. National and sub-na-
tional actors in Africa, especially the ruling governments, too, would some-
times seek and even encourage certain types of Chinese intervention for their 
own beneﬁt. What has been seen by the Angolan government as China’s “inef-
fective” intervention has, for instance, led to the relative deterioration in the 
bilateral relations of the two countries (Corkin 2008, 120-121). The Angolan 
government sought more “eﬀective” Chinese intervention in relation to the 
2009 Presidential election in the country.
With the above provision, it can be argued that Chinese non-intervention 
is more evident in regard to human rights and governance. China often looks 
away when African dictators violate the human rights of their compatriots. 
Although China has pursued this policy for many decades since it began dip-
lomatic relations with African countries, the policy has come under greater 
scrutiny in recent years.
As indicated already, China is not considered as a messenger of peace in 
Africa. But China’s contribution toward peace-making or peace-keeping 
operations in the continent cannot be also totally overlooked. “Between 2001 
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and 2006, Chinese personnel contribution to PKO activities in Africa 
increased by ten-fold” (Huang and Morrison 2007, 5). Paradoxically, one of 
the countries in Africa to which China contributed hundreds of peace-keep-
ing oﬃcers is also the Congo. The paradox is that China or Chinese arms had 
contributed in fueling the same conﬂict. Only time would tell about the 
implications of fueling a conﬂict and trying to extinguish it later. While such 
contradictory behaviors are not unique to China, they do add up to the com-
plex and confounding nature of Sino-African relations at the present time.
Soft Power and Hard Realities
We have highlighted the emphasis in China’s foreign policy on bilateral rela-
tions with African states. Parallel to bilateralism is the focus on elite-to-elite 
diplomacy. These policy orientations are also reﬂected in the minimum role 
NGOs have come to play in China’s policy toward Africa. It must be admit-
ted that this pattern of foreign policy was not one-sidedly imposed upon 
Africa; it is partly a response to the realities of African politics and society.
Although Chinese policy toward Africa is elite-centered, however, there is 
also a sense in which Afro-Chinese relations can be viewed as people-cen-
tered. Chinese investment in Africa has often a Chinese labor component. 
There are already signiﬁcant numbers of Chinese health workers who assist 
and interact with ordinary Africans. But a large portion of Chinese nationals 
come to Africa not only as managers and entrepreneurs, technicians and doc-
tors, but also as small-scale traders and construction workers. The number of 
Chinese is increasing in Africa, and in this, China is unlike other major pow-
ers of the past. Olopade Dayo (2008) has noted recently: “There are already 
more Chinese living in Nigeria than there were Britons during the height of 
the empire.” By 2006, there were sizable Chinese expatriates in the following 
African countries: Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Cameron, Côte D’Ivoire, Zambia and 
Mozambique (Atlas 2006). An American diplomat has also predicted that 
these Chinese may never return to China (Shinn 2006, 7). Of course, it 
remains to be seen whether the situation would turn out as predicted.
The major consideration of Chinese entrepreneurs in bringing large num-
ber of Chinese workers to Africa has, of course, nothing to do with any pre-
occupation, on the part of China, with people-to-people diplomacy. Instead, 
it is primarily a result of cost-beneﬁt considerations of the legal, economic 
and technical consequences of doing otherwise. In any case, an opportunity 
has been created for ordinary Chinese to interact with ordinary Africans – for 
better or for worse. This unique feature of China’s engagement with Africa is 
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bound also to become a source of tension, with some signs to this eﬀect 
already visible (Askouri 2008, 151-156). There is a view in some African 
countries that “burgeoning Chinese communities in Africa have become 
closed enclaves, insensitive to local customs, norms and social practices” (Le 
Pere 2008, 32). Lumumba-Kasongo (2007, 15) also observes that: “Chinese 
investments in Africa tend to create more jobs for both Chinese technicians 
and small trader Chinese who migrate to Africa than for the Africans who 
badly need those jobs.”
Allegations have surfaced that some Chinese were even engaged in com-
mitting petty crimes in Ethiopia. If true, the story should not be surprising. 
Similar cases have been reported in other countries, such as in Botswana, 
where the Chinese embassy in the country was prompted to urge “all Chinese 
citizens in Botswana to observe the laws of Botswana . . .” (Bolaane 2007, 163 
& 168).
It is not a mischaracterization of recent history to say that the latest phase 
of Afro-Chinese relations began full of optimism – on both sides. That is to 
say that the wind has been blowing in favor of Sino-optimism. We have dis-
cussed in the previous sections the contending paradigms about why China 
is attracted to Africa. Let us conclude this section by identifying the diver-
gent approaches about major elements of China’s soft power in Africa on the 
issue of why Africans are generally attracted to China. Africa’s attraction 
toward China has in part to do with the long and positive history of Afro-
Chinese relations and China’s unique identity in comparison to other major 
powers.
China not only sees itself as integral part of Greater Asia, it even goes fur-
ther in asserting that it is part of the Third World. It is this perception of 
“self ” and the “other” which Sino-optimists view as underpinning the atti-
tudes and diplomatic orientations of China toward Africa. Even when seem-
ingly new approaches are adopted – as in the post Cold War period – the 
tenets of the foreign policies of China have basically remained the same.
The truth of the matter is, according to Sino-Skeptics, that China is no 
longer a “developing” country. In terms of its external economic relations and 
by related measures, China is in fact more “developed” than such countries as 
Canada, France and Italy (UNCTAD 2008, 123-126). Sino-Skeptics also see 
China’s considerable interest in investing in infrastructures tied to natural 
resources as a proof that China is merely pursuing its own narrow self-interest 
at the expense of Africa’s long-term interest. If China was also interested in 
Africa’s long-term development, they ask, why is it that China would not 
help enhance Africa’s own capacity to process and add value to these 
resources? They conclude that China is a neo-colonial power in the making 
in the mold of former colonial powers.
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Sino-optimists see Chinese model of socio-economic development as more 
suitable for African development. China is regarded as a country which has 
successfully resisted the neo-liberal model of political modernization but now 
boasts one of the fastest growing economies on the planet. The Prime Minis-
ter of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, also added his voice to Sino-optimism when 
he said: “it has now been proved the development paradigm in China has its 
own speciﬁc advantages…Chinese transformation disproved the pessimistic 
attitude that was, ‘if you are poor once, you are likely to be poor forever’ ” 
(The Ethiopian Herald, December 23, 2008).
A related perspective maintains that Africa has been attracted to China 
partly because of the pressure on Africa from the West. As Ian Taylor (2006, 
4) put it: “China’s renewed interest in Africa coincided with the new-found 
attention of the West in promoting liberal democracy and human rights.” 
Added to this is the claim that not only has the Western model in Africa 
failed to produce positive result but also the relationship between Africa and 
the West has been one-sided, exploitative and even responsible for Africa’s 
underdevelopment (Campbell 2008, 102).
Chinese active, one could even say creative, diplomacy in Africa has also 
reinforced its attractions to Africa. The fact that China cooperated with Nige-
ria in the launching of the ﬁrst African commercial satellite – Nig-Sat – falls 
into this category (Washington Post May 13, 2007 online accessed August 19, 
2008). Irrespective of whether or not such ambitious project would have had 
any meaningful impact, the message China was trying to send to Africa was 
interpreted by Sino-optimists such that China would treat its relations with 
Africa seriously, with respect and dignity. China’s grand gesture was viewed 
by Sino-optimists as an aﬃrmation of its genuine desire for a meaningful 
partnership with Africa.
Sino-optimists are not sure, on the other hand, about the commitment of 
the West to a genuine partnership with Africa. A Nigerian diplomat was 
recently quoted as saying: “China combines aid and investment in a compel-
ling fashion, versus the West’s notion of how to ‘help’ Africa, in which mos-
quito nets and vaccinations still dominate the dialogue” (Dayo 2008). It is in 
this context that Sino-optimists have welcomed what they regard as the Chi-
nese fresh approach which “eschews any interference in domestic aﬀairs, 
emphasizes partnership and solidarity among developing nations, and oﬀers 
an alternative development model based on a more central role of for the 
state” (Foster et al. 2008, viii).
Another dimension of China’s diplomacy which is relevant to its soft 
power is culture, or more speciﬁcally, language. The Chinese have already 
built in Africa several Chinese language schools (We Ping 2007, 28). The 
 primary motivation for teaching Chinese language (mandarin) to Africans is 
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not the Chinese desire to “internationalize” Africans or themselves. Here 
again economic considerations are paramount. China also believes, it is fair 
to add, that Afro-Chinese relations would be long-lasting.
Africa, China and World Order
The ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century will perhaps be remembered as a 
period when China made its emergence as a potential hegemon felt around 
the world. It is also in this decade that the West began to seriously grapple 
with the implications of the rise of China and the imminent end of a ﬁve 
hundred year Western dominance in global aﬀairs. Will China integrate itself 
into the prevailing international system? Or, would it challenge the system to 
create a new one which is more suitable to it? Will the West welcome a re-in-
vigorated China on equal footing? These are some of the major questions 
scholars are already wrestling with in relation to the rise of China.
What does the record show thus far? Is China challenging world order, a 
world order which was created and largely maintained by the West, or is it 
adapting itself to it? As on many other issues, analysts are divided on this 
one. On the one hand, there are for instance those who see in Chinese accel-
erated activities in Africa an outright challenge to the global hegemony of the 
West (Ampiah and Naidu 2008, 3-19; Campbell, 2008). Others see China as 
(capable of ) being co-opted by the West (Ikenburry 2008). Chinese behav-
iors in Africa so far suggest China is both a challenger of the Western hege-
mony, when its interests are perceived to be at stake, and a supporter when 
its interests suﬃciently converge with that of the West. But neither scenario 
has yet fully crystallized and there are forces which are pulling China in both 
directions.
That there will be increasing rivalry between China and the West is now a 
foregone conclusion – a rivalry for markets and raw materials, particularly 
oil. Sub-Saharan Africa will be one of the battleﬁelds if oil continues to be 
the major source of energy – as it is now. Fareed Zakaria (2008, 117) observes 
in his Post-American World: “…as China moves into Africa, it is taking up 
political, economic and military space that was occupied by Britain, France 
or the United States. This will necessarily mean friction as each great power 
struggles to promote its own interests and its own conception of doing the 
right thing in Africa.”
The rivalry and potential conﬂict between the United States (or the West) 
and China will not be ideological – as Francis Fukuyama (1992) had 
 suggested in his The End of History. Neither would it be primarily cultural – 
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as Samuel Huntington’s (1997) The Clash of Civilizations predicts. Instead it 
would be a conﬂict over raw materials, particularly oil and markets.
Whichever future scenario is fulﬁlled, Africa cannot be a signiﬁcant player 
in the new international system and have a say in it in a way beneﬁcial to its 
own interest unless the continent strengthen its collective bargaining position 
and speak in one voice. Not many years ago African political scientist Ali 
Mazrui (2000, 275-283) grappled with the issue of how to restore justice to 
the international system and how Africa could squeeze out concessions from 
the liberal international economic order. He identiﬁed two types of solidarity 
in the Global South. Strategic solidarity refers to the joining of hands 
between Africa and the rest of the developing world in order to gain leverage 
over the economic transaction with the countries in the North. Organic soli-
darity signiﬁes African unity, the quest for Africans to speak in one voice 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
As matters now stand, however, strategic solidarity has become a less realis-
tic approach. Firstly, the developmental gap within the global South is not 
only wide but is widening by the day. Secondly, strategic solidarity approach 
is in part premised not only on the idea that what is good for one part of the 
global South is also necessarily good for the other part, a notion based on the 
presupposition of commonality of interest and unity of purpose engendered 
by shared historical experience and common pigmentational identity. But 
widening economic gaps within the global South are also creating divergent 
interests. From the Bandung Conference to the non-Aligned movement, the 
strategic solidarity approach has not produced the result many had expected, 
and there are not compelling reasons which would suggest the result would 
be diﬀerent this time. Under the circumstances, a more realistic approach 
would probably be one which centers on organic solidarity. Less ambitious in 
its goals, this approach requires that Africa create some form of integration, a 
way of coordinating its foreign economic policies, based on the recognition 
that not doing so would not only marginalize Africa further, it would also 
reward others at Africa’s expense.
If Africa could manage to speak in one voice, it could play oﬀ diﬀerent 
powers for its own beneﬁt. In addition, the same approach could be pursued 
with respect to a united Europe which, as Patrick Bond and Richard Kamidza 
(2008, 2) put it, continues to underdevelop Africa by dealing with “individ-
ual African countries in an especially pernicious way…” Africa has at its dis-
posal resources and potential market which are indispensable for fueling the 
economies of major powers. African unity will also enhance the continent’s 
relative power position in the international system. The stronger an actor’s 
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relative power position is in a system, history of international politics teaches 
us, the less important would become the preferences of the stronger actors.
The emerging structure of the international system in some ways resembles 
the one which prevailed in the immediate aftermath of Africa’s decoloniza-
tion in the1960s when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, 
competed for friendship with the newly independent African states, when, 
for instance, Kwame Nkrumah (1957, 164) could go to Washington and say: 
“. . . I was appealing to the democracies of Britain and the United States for 
their assistance in the ﬁrst place but if this should not be forthcoming, I 
would be forced to turn elsewhere.” Because Africa is a region which has least 
beneﬁted from the current world order, the rivalry between the West and 
China would beneﬁt the continent, and the outcome would also signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuence the African condition, an outcome which will in turn be deter-
mined by, among other things, the extent of the rising state’s dissatisfaction 
with the status quo, its level of risk-taking or its assumptions about the 
expected costs of war.
Informed opinion is divided about whether China would challenge the 
prevailing system in the future or adapt itself to it. On this, some analysts are 
non-committal, suggesting it is too early to say whether the transition from 
Euro-centric to Sino-centric world would be peaceful. Others, of whom 
many are neo-liberal scholars of international relations, see a great incentive 
as well as imperative for China to join the system (see, for instance, Iken-
burry 2008, 23-37). The same scholars stress that it is in the interest of the 
West to accommodate rising China. And still others with realist theoretical 
orientations speculate that not only is China unwilling to ﬁt in the old sys-
tem but also it is unable to do so (Khanna 2008, 439-456).
Table 4
Current and Projected Military and Economic Powers of China and the 
United States in the 21st Century
GDP in USD 





2005 9 12 2003 60 417
2010 14 17 2010 88 482
2015 21 22 2015 121 554
2020 30 28 2020 152 628
2025 44 37 2025 190 711
2030 63 49 2030 238 808
Source: Adapted from Ikenburry (2008)
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One of the major incentives for China to integrate itself into the capitalist 
world system would probably be its desire for peaceful change. Such a peace-
ful transition is a possibility with China gradually transforming itself into a 
global hegemon. Another scenario is that the US would negatively react to 
the rising China and this would lead to conﬂict and war. The dynamic of 
international relations and the global ambitions of the US and China suggest 
a probability of conﬂict between the two countries. Parag Khanna (2008, 
337) captures this dynamic as follows: “As the relative levels of power of the 
three superpowers [US, China and EU] draw closer, the temptation of the 
number two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does 
the lead power’s incentive to preventively attack and weaken its ascending 
rival before being eclipsed.” Khanna (2008, 337) adds, quoting David Hume: 
“It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces 
envy, but on the contrary, the proximity.”
Another factor which makes less than peaceful transition likely is the fact 
that historically there never was a time in the so-called modern period when 
two countries so powerful and so culturally diﬀerent have confronted each 
other. The modern world so far only saw alternations among “Western” pow-
ers for global hegemony. The lack of transparency of the Chinese political 
system accompanied with the vast cultural diﬀerences between the two would 
further compound the possibility of peaceful power transition.
In addition, there is also a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the American and Chi-
nese conceptualization of world order. Chinese openly advocate multi-polar-
ity; the US seeks to preserve or at least prolong “the unipolar moment” (Keith 
2004; Wenping 2007b). The strategic importance of power positions of two 
states is great if they do not share similar preferences. In situations where 
there is such a vast cultural diﬀerence, it is next to impossible to forge a 
shared notion of legitimate process and outcome.
Realist and liberal theories of power transition therefore strongly suggest 
the inevitability of major conﬂict between the US and China. A factor which 
may mitigate the historical tendency toward violent international change is 
that today’s world is more interdependent and globalized than at any time 
before. The realization of this plain fact may impose greater constraint on 
great power behavior. Furthermore the presence of nuclear weapons which 
has made major war most costly and destructive would create incentives both 
for the rising hegemon and other powers to work out a peaceful means of 
transition. But then human history also teaches that rationality fails some-
time when it is most needed.
One helpful step by China toward diﬀusing potential tension with other 
powers has been its introduction of market principles – the absence of which 
would have become a major source of friction and conﬂict with Western 
powers. Free market economy removes one of the sources of conﬂict over raw 
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materials and markets by leaving these issues to the “invisible hand”. While 
the free market approach has for now minimized the risk of a major conﬂict 
between China and the U.S. over raw materials and markets, the fact that the 
two countries belong and subscribe to diﬀerent “moral values” could still pro-
vide a fertile soil for conﬂict.
Nobody should pray for disaster. But if China is co-opted into the prevailing 
system, Africa’s place would probably not be much diﬀerent from what has 
always been the case in the current system. If China continues to challenge the 
system, Africa would probably beneﬁt by not only playing one power oﬀ 
against the other but also by actively participating in the creation of a new and 
more just international system. In either case Africa needs ﬁrst to get it acts 
together, speak in one voice and strengthen its collective bargaining position.
Conclusion
Any generalization about China’s policy in Africa, whether it is optimistic, 
skeptical or pessimistic, can be truly misleading. The very notion of China in 
Africa is inaccurate to some extent for China does not deal with Africa per se, 
but with individual African countries. And the sum total of China’s relations 
with African countries is not the same as China’s relations with Africa. What 
this also means is that both the nature and eﬀect of China’s activities in Africa 
would vary from country to country. China could become a force for good in 
one country and not in another.
Secondly, the fact that China is a relative new-comer to Africa as an aspir-
ing major power means that it is too early to assess the wider impacts. In 
other words, the dominant pattern of Chinese activities, as far as long-term 
consequences are concerned, is that it does not have a pattern yet. Factors 
internal to China, Africa and the global political economy could all aﬀect the 
current trajectories of Chinese activities in Africa and their eﬀects. But Afro-
Chinese relations are suﬃciently ﬂuid at the moment for both Africa and 
China to be able to re-organize the guiding principles.
China is distinct in important ways from Western powers. Yet, it is also 
behaviorally similar to emerging global powers of the past. What lies ahead 
in the context of Afro-Chinese relationship may therefore be neither the best 
of all worlds, which is seen by Sino-optimists, nor just another era which is 
suspiciously similar to the past, which is dreadfully envisaged by Sino-skep-
tics and Sino-pessimists. Every era has its own dynamics; and it combines a 
little bit of both.
 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 353
References
Acharya, Amitav. 2008. “China and Southeast Asia: Some Lessons for Africa.” In Crouching 
Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, Cape 
Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 314-325.
Alden, Chris, Dan Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. 2008. “China Returns to Africa: 
 Anatomy of an Expansive Engagement.” Documento de Trabajo. Real Instituto Elcano work-
ing paper 51/2008. http: www.realinstitutoelcano.com (accessed June 12, 2009).
Alden, Chris. 2006. “Through African Eyes: Representations of China on the African Continent.” 
Unpublished paper presented at SciPo/Fudan/LSE conference, October 2, 2006.
Anshan, Li. 2007. “China and Africa: Policy and Challenge.” China Security 3, 3: 69-73.
Askouri, A. 2008. “Civil Society Initiative in Africa.” In China’s New Role in Africa and the 
South. A Search for a New Perspective, edited by Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji, 
Cape Town: Fahamu, pp. 151-156.
Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa, ECOWAS-SWAC OECD. 2006. http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/42/26/38409391.pdf p. 8. (Accessed August 25, 2008)
Baregu, Mwesiga. 2008. “The Three Faces of the Dragon: Tanzania-China Relations in Histori-
cal Perspective.” In Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku 
Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, 152-166, Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Bolaane, Maiteso. 2007. “China’s Relations with Botswana: An Historical perspective.” In Afro-
Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future, edited by Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Cape Town: CSAS, 
142-174.
Broadman, Harry G. 2007. Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontiers. Wash-
ington, DC: The World Bank.
Campbell, Horace. 2008. “China in Africa: Challenging US Global Hegemony.” Third World 
Quarterly 29, 1: 89-105.
Carmody, Padraig and Francis Owusu. 2006. “Competing Hegemons? Chinese versus Ameri-
can Geo-economic Strategies in Africa.” Paper Presented at the meeting of Association of 
American Geographers, Chicago, Il, March.
Chuen, L.T. 2008. “Regulating China? Regulating Globalization?” In China’s New Role in 
Africa and the South. A Search for a New Perspective, edited by Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and 
Firoze Manji, Cape Town: Fahamu, pp. 13-16.
Corkin, Lucy. 2008. “All’s Fair in Loans and War: The Development of China-Angola Rela-
tions.” In Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and 
Sanusha Naidu, Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 108-123.
Curtis, Devon. 2008. “Partner or Predator in the Heart of Africa? Chinese Engagement with 
the DRC.” In Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah 
and Sanusha Naidu, Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 86-107.
Dayo, O. 2008. “China’s long march across Africa.” August 6th 2008 [online],http://www.ther-
rot.com/id47560/(accessed August 25th).
Foster, Viven, William Butterﬁeld Chuan Chen and Nataliya Pushak. 2008. Building Bridges: 
China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Africa. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last man. London: Penguin.
Guerreo, Dorothy-Grace and F. Manji. 2008. “Introduction: China’s New Role in Africa and 
the South.” In China’s New Role in Africa and the South. A Search for a New Perspective, edited 
by Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji, Cape Town: Fahamu, pp. 1-6.
Habib, Adam. 2008. “Western Hegemony, Asian Ascendancy and the New Scramble for 
Africa.” In Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and 
Sanusha Naidu, Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 259-277.
354 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355
Huang, Chin-Hao and J. Stephen Morrison. 2007. “Assessing China’s Growing Inﬂuence in 
Africa.” China Security 3, 3: 3-21.
Huntington, Samuel. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New 
York: Touchstone.
Ikenburry, G.J. 2008. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Can the Liberal System-
Survive?” Foreign Aﬀairs 87, 1: 23-37.
Jiang, Chung-Lian. 2004. “Oil: A New Dimension in Sino-African Relations.” http://www.
african-geopolitics.org (Accessed May 24, 2008).
Kamidza, R. and P. Bond. 2008. “How Europe Underdevelops Africa.” Pambazuka News: 
Weekly Forum for Social Justice in Africa, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/ 
48819 (Accessed October 29, 2009)
Keet, D. 2008. “The Role and Impact of Chinese Economic Operations in Africa.” In China’s 
New Role in Africa and the South. A Search for a New Perspective, edited by Dorothy-Grace 
Guerrero and Firoze Manji, Cape Town: Fahamu, pp. 78-86.
Keith, Ronald C. 2004. “China as a Rising World Power and Its Response to ‘Globalization.’ ” 
The Review of International Aﬀairs 3, 4: 507-523.
Khanna, P. 2008. The Second World: Empires and Inﬂuence in the Global Order. New York: Ran-
dom House.
Le Pere, Garth. 2008. “The Geostrategic Dimensions of the Sino-African Relationship.” In 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha 
Naidu, 20-38, Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. 2007. “China-Africa Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Dia-
lectics of Rethinking South-South Dialogue.” CODESRIA Bulletin 1 & 2: 8-16.
Maswana, Jean-Claude. 2009. “ Can China Trigger Economic Growth in Africa? An Empirical 
Investigation Based on the Economic Interdependence Hypothesis.” The Chinese Economy 
42, 2: 91-105.
Mazrui, Ali. 2000. “Technological Underdevelopment in the South: The Continuing Cold 
War.” In Principled World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations, edited 
by Paul Wapner and Lester Edwin J. Ruitz, Lanham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, pp. 275-283.
Ndulo, Muna 2008. “Chinese Investment in Africa.” In Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa 
and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, Cape Town: University of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal Press, 138-151.
Nkrumah, K. 1957. The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & 
Sons Ltd.
Peter, H. and Wedman, Andrew. 2007. “Oil and Conﬂict in Sino-American Relations.” China 
Security 3, 3, online. http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id= 104&Ite mid=8 (Accessed October 29, 2009)
Sachicnoye, Lloyd. 2008. “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Zimbabwe-China Relations.” In 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha 
Naidu, Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 124-137.
Sautman, B. and Y. Hairong. 2008. “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with 
Africa.” In China’s New Role in Africa and the South. A Search for a New Perspective, edited by 
Dorothy-Grace Guerrero and Firoze Manji, Cape Town: Fahamu, pp. 87-97.
Shinn, David. 2006. Africa and China’s Global Activism. Paper Presented at the National 
Defense University Paciﬁc Symposium, June 20.
Spero, J.E. and J.A. Hart. 2001. The Politics of International Economic Relations. 7th Edition. 
Boston: Wadsworth.
Srinivasan, Sharath. 2008. “A Marriage Less Convenient: China, Sudan and Darfur.” In Crouch-
ing Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China, edited by Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu, 
Cape Town: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, pp. 55-85.
 S. Adem / African and Asian Studies 9 (2010) 334-355 355
Taylor, Ian. 2006. “Unpacking China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa.” Working paper no. 19, 
Center on China’s Transnational Relations, The Hong Kong University of St. Andrews.
UNCTAD. 2008. UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008. New York & Geneva.
Wenping, He. 2007a. “The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy.” China Security 3, 3: 23-40.
——. 2007b. “The Evolution of China’s Africa Policy.” In Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present 
and Future, edited by Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Cape Town: Center for Advanced Studies of African 
Society, pp. 25-47.
Yonghong, Hong. 2007. “The African Charter and China’s Legislation: A Comparative Study 
of Ideas of Human Rights.” In Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present and Future, edited by 
Kwesi Kwaa Prah, Cape Town: Center for Advanced Studies of African Society, pp. 88-100.
Zafar, Ali. 2007. “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeco-
nomic, Trade, Investment and Aid Links.” The World Bank Research Observer 22, 1: 103-130.
Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. The Post-American World. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co.
